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	 We try to perform geometrization of psychology  by representing mental states, “ideas,” ideas by points of 
a metric space—mental space.  Evolution  of ideas is described by dynamical systems in metric mental space. We apply 
the  mental  space approach for modeling of flows of unconscious and conscious information in the human brain. In a 
series of models, Models 1-4, we consider cognitive systems with increasing complexity of psychological behavior 
determined by structure of flows of ideas. Since our models are in fact models of the AI-type, one immediately 
recognizes that they can be used for creation of AI-systems, which we call psycho-robots, exhibiting important 
elements of human psyche. 
Creation of such psycho-robots may be useful improvement of domestic robots. At the moment domestic robots are 
merely simple working devices (e.g. vacuum cleaners or lawn mowers) . However, in future one can expect demand in  
systems which be able not only perform simple work tasks, but would have elements of human self-developing  psyche. 
Such AI-psyche could play an important role both in relations between psycho-robots and their owners as well as 
between psycho-robots. Since the presence of a huge numbers of psycho-complexes is an essential characteristic of 
human psychology, it would be interesting to model them in the AI-framework. 
 
 

	 Mental space, dynamical systems, conscious/unconscious flows of information.  psychoanalysis, 
complexes, symptoms, hidden  forbidden wishes, desires,  repression, resistance force, modeling of psyche, psycho-
robots  
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The aim of this paper is to present a mental AI-model  based on a geometric representation of  mental processes.  This 
model can be considered as the first step in coming AI-formalization of foundations of psychoanalytic research. 1 
Mathematical foundations for the present AI-model were developed in a series of works Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 
1999a,b, 2000a,b, 2002a and Albeverio et al., 1999, and Dubischar et al, 1999. Unfortunately, the high level of 
mathematical presentation in these works makes them non readable for people working in AI, computer science, 
psychology. In the present article we would like to present the main distinguishing AI-features of our model without 
using the formal mathematical  apparatus. Another important difference of this paper from mentioned works is that now 
we do not try to specify the set-theoretic and topological structure of mental space.  In previous works we developed 
one special mathematical model of mental space given by hierarchical trees (so called utrametric spaces), see 
Khrennikov,  2004a, b, for neurophysiological basis for such spaces.  Although such encoding of hierarchy into space 
topology is very promising (especially by taking into account the role of hierarchical structures in psychology), we find 
possible to proceed in modeling of flows of conscious/unconscious mind in the most general framework of arbitrary 
metric mental space.  However, from the very beginning we emphasize that we could not exclude that practical creation 
of AI-psyche would be based on the hierarchical encoding of information by using trees equipped with ultrametric 
distance. 
 
Our basic idea is to repeat in psychology and cognitive sciences the program of   which has been 
performed in physics. And we hope that through such geometrization we shall be able to represent some elements of 
human psyche in the AI-framework. We recall that in physics the starting point of the mathematical formalization was 
creation of an adequate mathematical model of physical space.  It was not so easy task. It took about three hundred 
years. However, finally, physicists got a well established model of space -- infinitely divisible real continuum.  Physical 
systems where embedded in this space.  Evolution  of a physical system was represented by dynamical system 
(continuous—differential equation or discrete—itterations of some map from physical space into itself) . The basic 
dynamical law—the second Newton law—was given in a simple differential form. We would like to do the same with 
mind: a)   to introduce mental space—“space of ideas” ; b)  to  consider dynamics in mental space—flows of ideas. 
 
After performing such a nontrivial task, we apply our approach to modeling of Freud’s  psychoanalysis. Here we 
propose a mental AI-model describing  flows of mind in the unconscious,  the subconsciousness, and the consciousness 
as well as mental flows between these domains.  The main attention will be paid to dynamics in the unconscious and 
the subconsciousness and their feedback coupling. Our  model does not say so much about consciousness. Moreover, 
we are not sure that a mental AI-model could be applied to the problem of consciousness at all. Our model describes 
(and can be even used for a mathematical simulation) of such basic features of psychoanalysis as repression of 
forbidden wishes, desires and impulses (coming to the subconsciousness from  the unconscious and going to the 
consciousness), complexes and corresponding symptoms. 
 
  
In a series of Models 1-4, we consider AI-modeling of cognitive systems with increasing complexity of psychological 
behavior determined by the structure of flows of ideas. One immediately recognizes that our models can be used for 
creation of AI-systems, which we call 	
	, exhibiting important elements of human psyche. Creation of 
such psycho-robots may be useful improvement of  	 	 At the moment domestic robots are merely 
simple working devices (e.g. vacuum cleaners or lawn mowers) . However, in future one can expect demand in  
systems which be able not only perform simple work tasks, but would have elements of human self-developing  
psyche.2 Such AI-psyche could play an important role both in relations between psycho-robots and their owners as well 
as between psycho-robots. Since the presence of a huge numbers of psycho-complexes (results of repression of 
forbidden desires) is an essential characteristic of human psychology, it would be interesting to model them in the AI-
framework. 
                                                 
1
 In spite of huge diversity of viewpoints on Freud´s psychoanalysis and its connections with  neurophysiology,  see, e.g., Macmillan, 
1997,  Gay, 1988,  Young-Bruehl, 1998 as well as Solms and  Turnbull, 2003, Green, 2003, Stein et al.,  2006, Solms, M.,  2002, 
2006a, 2006b,   for debates, the ideas of Sigmund Freud  are still important sources of inspiration and not  only in psychology, but 
also in cognitive sciences and even neurophysiology, neuro informatics and cybernetics as well as mental informatics and 
cybernetics. 
 
2
 People would obtain not simple service-devices, but a kind of robots-relatives. A new possibility to build  
close psychological relations with a domestic robot could attract customers. Our key point is that robot-psyche should 
be really humanoid-like. Hence, such a robot should evolve all our habits which would  induce with necessity main 
human psychological problems (including even psychopathic behavior), see our Model 4. 
 Our approach can be considered as extension of  the artificial intelligence  approach, Chomsky, 1963, Churchland and  
Sejnovski, 1992, to simulation of psychological behavior, cf. Boden, 1996, 1998, 2006. Especially close relation can be 
found with models of , see Langton et al., 1992 (and especially the article of Langton, 1992) , Yaeger, 1994, 
Collings and Jefferson, 1992.  We extend modeling of AI-life to  psychological processes. On the basis of the presented 
models,  we can create AI-societies of psycho-robots interacting with real people and observe evolution of psyche of 
psycho-robots (and even people interacting with them). We also mention development of theory of  	, see e.g. 
Meyer and Guillot, 1994 and Donnart and Meyer, 1996.  By similarity with Animats we call our psycho-robots: 
	
	 
 
Finally, as a motivation of our activity, we cite Herbert Simon: “AI can have two purposes. One is to use the power of 
computers to argument human thinking, just as we use motors to argument human or horse power. Robots and expert systems are 
major branches of this. The other is to use a computer’s AI to understand how humans think, In a humanoid way…. You are using 
AI to understand the human mind.” Our  aim is precisely to understand human mind and psychology via AI-modeling.  
 
 
 !		
 
The notion of a  	 is used in many applications for describing distances between objects. There is given a 
set of objects of any sort. They are called points.  There is defined a distance (metric) between any two points which is 
nonnegative and it has the following properties: 1). 	 the distance between two points equals to zero if and 
only if these points coincide; 2)   	
  
  the distance between two points does not depend on order in which 
points are taken.; 3)  "
 take three points and consider the corresponding triangle; each side of this 
triangle is less than or equal to the sum of two other sides. 
 
The main examples of metric spaces which  are used in physics are Euclidean spaces and their generalizations.  
However,  as we have seen  in Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a,b, 2002a and Albeverio et al., 1999, and 
Dubischar et al, 1999., another class of metric spaces might be essentially more adequate for applications to psychology 
and cognitive  sciences, so called    		 (in mathematical literature they  are also called non-
Archimedean spaces, Khrennikov, 1997).  Those spaces have geometries which differ crucially from geometries of 
physical spaces. However, we are not able to go into detail in the  present communication.  
 
#$
 % 	
 
We shall use the following mathematical model for mental space: 	 		&'	(  	
	 	 
 
Dynamical thinking, )     	, is performed via the following procedure:  a) an initial 
mental state (e.g. an external sensory input)  is sent to the unconscious domain;  b) it is iterated by some dynamical 
system3 which is given by a map from the mental  metric space into itself; c) if iterations converge  (with respect to the 
mental space metric) to an attractor 4, then this attractor is communicated to the subconsciousness; this is the 
solution of the initial problem. 5  In the simplest model, see Model 1 in section 4.1, this attractor is sent directly to the 
consciousness. 
 
Thus in  our  model  unconscious functioning of the brain is  	     	 The 
unconsciousness is a collection of dynamical systems (thinking processors) which produce new mental states 
                                                 
3
 The description of functioning of the human brain by dynamical systems (feedback processes) is a well established approach. The 
main difference between our approach and the conventional dynamical approach to cognition  (see Ashby, 1952, van Gelder and Port, 
1995, van Gelder, 1995, Strogatz, 1994, Eliasmith, 1996)  is that in the conventional dynamical approach  dynamical systems work 
in  the real physical space of electric potentials  and in our approach dynamical systems work in the mental space. Thus the 
conventional dynamical approach is about neuro processing of information, but our  approach is about purely mental flows of 
information.  
4
 We recall that a point of a metric space is called   of some dynamical system, if there exists a ball with the center at this 
point such that starting with any point of this ball as the initial condition iterations of the dynamical system will approach the 
attractor-point. 
5
 Depending on initial conditions and the dynamical law it may occur that iterations starting with some initial mental state will not 
approach any attractor. For example, starting with some state a dynamical system may perform the cyclic  behavior in the process of 
thinking. In such a case a cognitive system  would not find the solution of a problem under consideration. 
practically automatically. The consciousness only uses and control results (attractors in spaces of ideas) of functioning 
of unconscious processors. 
 
*	 		 				
 
We represent a few mathematical models of the information architecture of conscious systems cf., e.g., Fodor and 
Pylyshyn, 1988, Edelman, 1989, Voronkov, 2002a. We start with a quite simple model (Model 1). This model will be 
developed to more complex models which describe some essential features of human cognitive behavior. The following 
sequence of cognitive models is related to the process of evolution of the mental architecture of cognitive systems. 
 
*!	
 
A). The brain of a cognitive system is split into three domains: 		+			+		 
B). There are two control centers, namely,  			 SCC and 		
 UC. 
C). The main part of the unconscious domain is a 		  Dynamical thinking processors are located in 
this domain. In our mathematical models such processors are represented by maps from  mental  space  into itself. 
 
In the simplest case the outputs of one group of thinking processors are always sent to the unconscious control center 
UC  and the outputs of another group   are always sent to the subconscious control center SCC.6  The brain of such a 
cognitive system works in the following way, see section 3: a). external information (e.g., a sensor stimulus) is 
transformed by SCC into some initial idea-problem; the SCC sends this idea to a thinking processor which is located in 
the processing domain; b). Starting with this initial idea, the processor produces  via iterations an idea-attractor. 
 
We consider two possibilities: 
 
c1). If the thinking processor under consideration is one of processors with the UC-output, then the idea-attractor is 
transmitted to the control center UC.  This center sends it either as an initial idea to the processing domain or to an 
unconscious performance.  
c11). In the first case some processor (it can have either conscious or unconscious  output) performs iterations starting 
with this idea and it  produces a new idea-attractor.  
c12). In the second case there is produced some unconscious reaction. 
 
c2). If the thinking processor under consideration is one of  processors with the SCC-output, then the idea-attractor is 
transmitted directly to the control center SCC. This center sends it either again to the processing domain (as an initial 
idea) or to physical or mental performance (speech, writing), or to memory. Those performances can be conscious as 
well as unconscious.  In the first case the idea-attractor should be transmitted by SCC to the conscious domain. 
 
In this primitive model there is no additional analysis of the idea-attractor  which was produced in the unconscious 
domain. Each attractor is recognized by the control center SCC as the solution of an initial problem, compared with 
models 2-4. Those attractors are wishes, desires and impulses produced  by the unconsciousness. Moreover, it is natural 
to assume that some group of thinking processors  have their outputs only inside the processing domain.  Thus they do 
not send outputs to the control centers. An idea-attractor  produced by such a processor is transmitted neither to SCC 
nor to UC. The idea-attractor  is directly used as the initial condition by some processor. 
 
                                                 
6
 Information produced by processors with UC-outputs cannot be directly used in the subconscious or conscious domains. This 
information circulates in the unconscious domain. Information produced  by processors with SCC-outputs can be directly used in the 
subconscious domain. 
  
,    -  Besides the unconscious control center UC and the processing domain, the unconscious 
domain contains some other structures (empty boxes of this picture). These additional structures (in the subconscious as 
well as unconscious domains) will be introduced in more complex models. We shall also describe the character of 
connections between SCC and UC.} 
 
 
 
* !  		
 
One of the possibilities to improve functioning of a cognitive system is to  create a queue of ideas  waiting for 
realizations. Thus it is natural to assume that the subconscious domain contains some    in that all “waiting 
ideas” are gathered. 
 
Ideas in the collector must be ordered for successive  realizations. The same order structure can be used to delete some 
ideas if the collector is complete. Thus all ideas-attractors must be classified. 
 
Each idea-attractor obtains some quantitative characteristic that gives a 		 to this idea. We may 
assume that this quantity takes values in segment [k, 1], where k is a nonnegative real number (it depends on the range 
of values of the distance between mental points, see later on  the concrete construction for the measure of interst). 
If the measure of interest for some idea equals 1, then such an idea is extremely interesting for the cognitive system 
under consideration. If the measure of interest for some idea equals k,  then the cognitive system   is not  at all 
interested in such an idea.  
 
We assume that there exists a threshold  of the minimal interest for realization --  	 If the 
measure of interest to some idea is less than the  realization threshold, then the control center SCC directly deletes this 
idea,  despite the fact that the idea was produced in the unconscious domain as the solution of some problem.  If the 
measure of interest for some idea is larger than the  realization threshold, then SCC sends this idea  to the collector of 
ideas waiting for  realization. 
 
Any cognitive system  lives in the continuously changed environment. It could not be concentrated on realization of 
only old ideas-attractors  even if they are interesting. Realizations of new ideas which are related to the present instant 
of time t can be more important. The time-factor must be taken into account. Thus the measure of interest to any idea  
should depend on time and it should decrease with time. The speed of decreasing  of  the measure of interest can 
depend on the idea. Finally, if  the measure of interest becomes less than the realization threshold such an idea-attractor 
is deleted from the collector. 
 
It is natural to assume the presence of a 	)	 If an idea has an extremely high value of interest—
which is larger than  the preserving threshold, then such an idea must be realized in any case. In our model we postulate 
that for such an idea the measure of interest is not changed  with time. We now describe one of the possible models for 
finding the value of interest for ideas-attractors. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the brain is able to 
measure the distance between ideas. The subconscious domain of the brain of a cognitive system  contains a 
					
	 . The interest-database is continuously created  on 
the basis of mental experiences. It is the cornerstone of Ego (in coming models Ego will be essentially extended). The 
subconscious domain contains a special block, comparator, that measures the distance between two ideas, and the 
distance between an idea and the set of interesting ideas. At the present level of development of neurophysiology we 
cannot specify mental distance. Moreover, neural realization of  mental distance may depend on a cognitive system or 
class of cognitive systems. However, the 			% gives some reasons 
to suppose that functioning of a brain might be based on neuronal trees which induce ultrametric mental space, see 
Khrennikov 2002a, 2004a.  Our present considerations  are presented for an arbitrary metric. It is only important that 
the brain is able  to measure the distance between ideas and between an idea and a collection of ideas. 
 
We recall that the distance between a point (in our case an idea) and a finite set (in our case the collection of interesting 
ideas) is defined as the minimum of distances between this point and  points of the finite set. If an idea-attractor is close 
to some idea from the interest-database, then the distance between this idea-attractor and the database is also small. If 
an idea-attractor is far from all interesting ideas, then the distance between this idea-attractor and the database is large.  
We now define mathematically a measure of interest for an idea-attractor  as the following quantity: one over the sum 
of the distance (between this idea-attractor and  the interest-database) and one: 7   
 
                                      MEASURE OF INTEREST = 1/(DISTANCE +1). 
 
Thus,  if  the distance  is small the measure of interest is large ;  if the distance is large it is small.8 
 
We now can determine the value of the parameter k (the lowest possible value of the measure of interest).  Denote by 
the symbol L maximum of distances between  all possible pairs of mental points.  Thus the minimal possible value of 
the measure of  interest is equal to  
 
                                                                    k=1/(L+1).   
 
Here L can finite as well as infinite. In the latter case k=0.   Finally, we remark that, since the minimal distance equals 
zero, the maximal value of the measure of interest is 1. Thus it takes values in the segment [k, 1]. 
 
                                                 
7
 We shift the distance by one to escape the appearance of zero in  the denominator. 
8
 We can consider the measure of interest as an emotional characteristic (quantative!)  of an AI-system. Of course, this 
general emotion of interest can be essentially refined by introducing a number of data bases corresponding to various 
forms of interest: love, social communication,…  
  
 ! 	)
-  A new block -- comparator (it is denoted 
byCOMPAR) --  in the subconscious domain measures the distance between an idea-attractor (it is denoted by J) which 
has been produced in the unconscious domain and the database  of interesting ideas (the latter is denoted I-D.  This 
distance determines the level of interest for an idea-attractor.  Ideas waiting for realization (they are denoted J1, J2,..., 
JN) are collected in a special collector. They are ordered with respect to values of their measures of interest.If  for some 
idea-attractor its measure of interest is larger than  the preserving threshold, then the value of interest to this idea does 
not decrease with time. 

*#!# 	
 
The life of a cognitive system which was described by Model 2 is free of contradictions. Such a cognitive system is 
always oriented to realizations of the most interesting ideas, wishes, desires. However, environment (and, in particular, 
social environment) produces some constraints to realizations of some interesting ideas. In a mathematical model we 
introduce a new quantity which describes a  	 for an idea-attractor. It can be again assumed 
that the measure of interdiction takes values in the segment [k, 1]. Ideas-attractors with small measures of interdiction 
have low levels of interdiction. If for some idea its measure of interdiction is approximately equal to k,  then this is a 
“free idea”. Ideas  with large measures of interdiction have high levels of interdiction. If for some idea its measure of 
interdiction is approximately equal to one, then such an idea is “totally forbidden.” The interdiction function is 
computed in the same way as the interest function. The subconscious domain contains a 	
	. 
9Here the notion “forbidden ideas” should be  interpreted extremely widely. For example, such a database 
contains  the subject’s ethical and other standards which are represented in  the form of restrictions. 
 
In Model 3 the comparator measures not only the distance  between an idea-attractor  (which has been transmitted to 
the conscious domain from the unconscious domain) and the set of interesting idea, but also the distance between an 
idea-attractor  and the set of forbidden ideas. This distance is defined as minimum  with respect to distances between 
the idea-attractor and all ideas belonging  to the interdiction-database. If the attractor is close to some forbidden  idea, 
then the distance is  small. If the attractor is far from all forbidden ideas, then the distance is large. 
 
We define the measure of interdiction in the same way as  we have defined the measure of interest. This is  the 
following quantity: one over the sum of the  distance between this idea-attractor and  the interdiction-database and one. 
The  measure of interdiction is large if the distance is small and it is small if the distance is large.  
 
The control center SCC must take into account not only the level of interest of an idea-attractor,  but also the level of 
interdiction of this idea. The struggle between interest  and interdiction induces essential features of human 
psychology.10  We consider a simple  model of such a struggle. For an idea-attractor we define 		
 (between 
interest and interdiction)  as a linear combination of the measures of interest and interdiction: 
 
                                                 
9
 The measure of interdiction is another  emotional characteristic of an AI-system. 
 
                                     CONSISTENCY = a INTEREST + b INTERDICTION, 
 
where a and b are some real coefficients. Such a linear combination depends on a cognitive system. In the simplest case 
it can be  just the difference between these measures: 
 
                                     CONSISTENCY = INTEREST - INTERDICTION 
 
Such a functional describes “normal behaviour.” A risky person may have e.g. the following  functional:   
 
                                     CONSISTENCY = a INTEREST - INTERDICTION,  
 
where the coefficient a is sufficiently large. Such a guy would neglect danger and interdiction and he will be extremely  
stimulated even by a minimal interest. We can consider even an “adrenalin-guy” having  
 
                                     CONSISTENCY = INTEREST + INTERDICTION  
 
For him danger and interdiction are not less exciting than the interest. 
 
We now modify Model 2 and consider, instead of the realization threshold based on the measure of interest,  a 
realization  threshold which is based on the measure of consistency.  The presence of such a threshold plays the role  
of a filter against “inconsistent ideas-attractors.” If for some idea-attractor its measure  of consistency is larger than the 
consistency-threshold, then such an idea will stay in the collector of ideas waiting for realization. In the opposite case 
such an idea will be deleted without any further analysis. 
 
It is convenient to consider a special block in the subconscious domain, an 
. This block contains: a) the 
comparator  which measures distances from an idea-attractor to databases of interesting and forbidden ideas; b) a 
computation device which calculates measures of interest, interdiction and consistency; this device also checks 
consistency of an idea (by comparing it with the realization threshold); c) a transmission device which sends an idea-
attractor to the collector or trash.  In the model under consideration the order in the queue of ideas  in the collector is 
based on the measure of consistency. It is also convenient to introduce a special block -- 	), in the subconscious 
domain which orders ideas in the collector with respect to values of their consistency. 
 
 
 
,  -# A cognitive system  described by Model 3 has complex cognitive  behavior. However, this 
complexity does  not imply “mental problems”. The use of the consistency functional -- a linear combination of the 
measures of interest and interdiction --  solves the contradiction between interest and interdiction for an idea-attractor. 
 
 
We can again assume that there exists a preserving threshold  such that ideas-attractors having the consistency larger 
than this  threshold  must be realized in any case. It is natural to assume that the  preserving threshold is essentially 
larger than the realization one. This threshold plays the important role in the process of the time evolution of 
consistency of an idea-attractor in the collector. 
 
We can  assume that the consistency-measure  decreases exponentially with time (thus this quantity will very quickly 
become  less than the realization threshold and after that this idea will disappear  from the collector without any  trace  
and hence it will be never realized).  But it will be assumed that if the consistency-measure is larger than the  
preserving threshold then this measure will not be changed.  
 
The main disadvantage of the cognitive system  described by Model 3 is that the analyzer  permits the realization of 
ideas  which have at the same time very high levels of interest and interdiction (if  the measures of interest and 
interdiction  compensate each other in the consistency function). For example, let the consistency function be equal to 
the difference between the measure of interest and the measure of interdiction. Assume that the realization threshold is 
equal to zero. For such a brain the analyzer  sends to the collector  totally forbidden ideas  (with measure of interdiction 
which is approximately equal to one)  having extremely high interest (with measure of  interest which is approximately 
equal to one)  Such a  behavior (a storm of cravings) can be dangerous, especially in a group of cognitive systems with 
a social structure. Therefore functioning of the analyzer  must be based on a more complex analysis of ideas-attractors 
which is not reduced to the calculation of the consistency function and comparing it with the realization threshold. 
 
**!*				
 
Suppose that a cognitive system described by Model 3 improves  its brain by introducing two new thresholds: the 
	  . 	 and  the 	 . . If for some idea-attractor its 
measure of interest is larger than the maximal interest threshold, then such an idea  is extremely interesting.  The 
cognitive system can not simply delete this attractor.  If for some idea-attractor its measure of interest is larger than the 
maximal interdiction  threshold, then such an  idea is strongly forbidden. The cognitive system can not simply send this 
idea to the collector to wait for realization. We now introduce the ' 	(. These are ideas such that 
both measures of interest and interdiction are larger that the corresponding maximal thresholds. If an idea-attractor 
belongs to the domain of doubts, then the cognitive system cannot take automatically (on the basis of the value of the 
consistency) the decision on realization  of this idea. 
 
/0		
 
On the one hand, the creation of an additional block in the analyzer to perform analysis of ideas-attractors by 
comparing them with maximal-interest and maximal-interdiction thresholds plays the positive role. Such a brain does 
not proceed  automatically  to realizations of dangerous ideas-attractors, despite their high attraction.  We recall that a 
brain described by Model 3 would proceed totally automatically by comparing the measure of consistency with the 
realization threshold. On the other hand, this step in the cognitive evolution induces mental problems for a cognitive 
system. In fact, the appearance of the domain of doubts in the mental space is the origin of some psychical problems 
and  mental diseases. Let the analyser find that an idea-attractor belongs to the domain of doubts— forbidden wish 
(desire, impulse, experience). 11  The brain is not able neither to realize such  an idea nor simply to delete it. What could  
a brain do in this situation?  The answer to this question was given in  Freud, 1962a,b: such a forbidden wish is 
shackled into the unconscious domain.12                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
                                                 
11
 “All these experiences had involved the emergence  of a wishful impulse which was in sharp contrast to the subjects other wishes 
and which proved incompatible with the ethical and  aesthetics standards of his personality,” Freud, 1962a. 
12
  “There had been a short conflict, and the end of this  internal struggle was that the idea which had been appeared before 
consciousness as the  vehicle of this irreconcilable wish fell a victim to repression, was pushed out of consciousness with all its 
attached memories and was forgotten. Thus the incompatibility  of the wish in question with the patient’s ego was the motive for the 
repression: the subject’s  ethical and other standards were the repressing forces. An acceptance of the incompatible  wishful impulse 
or a prolongation of the conflict would have produced a high degree of  unpleasure; this unpleasure was avoided by means of 
repression, which was thus revealed as one of devices serving to protect the mental personality,” Freud, 1962b. 
In our model, the unconscious domain contains (besides the processing domain and the unconscious control center UC) 
a special collector for repressed ideas --  		 By Freud’s  it is also a part of Ego (but an 
unconscious part). After a few attempts to transform an idea-attractor belonging to the domain of doubtful ideas into 
some non-doubtful idea, SCC sends such a doubtful idea-attractor to the  collector for repressed ideas.  
 
What can one say about the further evolution of a doubtful idea  in the collector for repressed ideas? It depends on a 
cognitive system (in particular, a human individual). In principle,  this collector  might play just the role of a 
churchyard for doubtful ideas. Such a collector  would not have output connections and a doubtful idea 
(hidden forbidden desire, wish, impulse, experience) would disappear after some period of time. 

/, .	1
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However, Freud demonstrated  that advanced cognitive systems (such as human individuals) could not isolate 
completely a hidden forbidden wish. They could not perform the complete interment of doubtful ideas in the  collector 
for repressed ideas. In our model, this collector has an output connection with the unconscious control center UC. At 
this moment the existence of such a connection seems to be just a disadvantage in the mental architecture of a cognitive 
system. It seems that such a cognitive system  was simply  not able to develop a neuronal structure for 100\%-isolation 
of the  collector for repressed ideas. However, later we shall see that the cyclic pathway: from SCC to the  collector for 
doubtful ideas, then to  UC, and, finally, again to SCC, has  important cognitive functions. We might speculate that 
such a connection was specially created in the process of evolution. But we start with the discussion on negative 
consequences of existence of this cyclic pathway.  
 
 
 ,  -* Starting with an initial idea J0 a processor PR0 produces an attractor J; the analyzer  computes 
the measures of interest and interdiction for this idea-attractor; the analyzer considers it as a doubtful idea: 
both measures of interest and interdiction are too high, they are larger than the maximal thresholds;  SCC sends this 
idea-attractor to the collector of repressed ideas; it becomes hidden forbidden wish; it  moves from  the collector of 
repressed ideas to the unconscious control center UC;  UC sends it to some processor PR that produces a new idea-
attractor JS. The analyzer may decide that this idea-attractor can be realized (depending on the distances from JS to 
databases of interesting and forbidden ideas and the magnitude of the realization threshold). In this case  the analyzer 
sends JS through the collector (of ideas waiting for realization) to a performance. Such an idea-attractor JS is  a 
symptom}induced by the original idea-attractor J  (in fact, by the initial idea J0). 
 
Our present considerations can be interpreted as creation of  AI-models for Freud’s theory of subconscious/unconscious 
mind. In our model an idea belonging to the collector for repressed  ideas has the possibility to move  to UC. The 
unconscious control center UC sends this idea to one of the thinking processors. This processor performs iterations 
starting with this hidden forbidden wish as an initial idea. It produces an idea-attractor.  In the simplest case the 
processor sends its output,  an idea-attractor, to the subconscious domain. The subconscious analyzer performs analysis 
of this idea.  If the idea does not belong to the domain of doubts, then the analyzer sends the idea to the collector of 
ideas waiting for realization. After some period of waiting the idea will be send  to realization.  By such a realization 
SCC removes this idea from the collector of ideas waiting for realization.  However, SCC does not remove the root of 
the idea (complex), namely the original hidden forbidden wish,  because the latter  is now located in the unconscious 
domain. And SCC is not able to control anything in this domain.  A new idea-attractor generated by this forbidden wish   
is nothing other than its new (unusual) performance. Such unconscious transformations of forbidden wishes were 
studied in Freud, 1962a,b, 1900.  In general a new wish—the final idea-attractor --   has no direct relation to the 
original forbidden wish. This is nothing but a 	
   of a cognitive system, cf. Freud, 1962b: “But the 
repressed wishful impulse continues  to exist in the unconscious.} It is on the 
look-out for an opportunity of being activated, and when that happens it 
succeeds in sending into consciousness a disguised and  unrecognized substitute 
for what has been repressed, and to this there soon become attached the same 
feelings of unpleasure which it was hoped had been saved by repression. This 
substitute for the repressed idea—the symptom—is proof against further attacks 
of defensive ego; and in place of a short conflict an aliment now appears which 
is not brought to an end by the passage of time.” 
 
/ 0		
 
A cognitive system  wants to prevent a new appearance of forbidden wishes  (which were expelled into the collector of 
repressed ideas)  in the subconscious (and then conscious) domain. In our model a brain has an additional analyzer, the 
unconscious one,  (located in the unconscious domain) that must analyze nearness of an idea-attractor produced by 
some processor and ideas which has been already collected  the collector of repressed ideas. The unconscious analyzer 
contains a comparator  that measures the distance between an idea-attractor  which has been produced by a thinking 
block and the database of hidden forbidden wishes: Then this collector calculates the corresponding measure of 
interdiction by using the same rule as it was used for the database of forbidden ideas in the subconsciousness. If such an 
unconscious interdiction is  large (approximately one),  then this idea-attractor is too close to ne of former hidden 
forbidden wishes. This idea should not be transmitted to the subconscious (and then conscious) domain. 
 
Each individual has its own % 	:  if the measure of unconscious interdiction (based on the 
comparing with  the database of hidden forbidden wishes) is less than the blocking threshold,  then such an idea-
attractor is transmitted into the subconscious and then conscious domains; if this measure is larger than the threshold, 
then such an idea-attractor  is deleted directly in the unconscious domain. In the latter case the idea-attractor will never 
come to the conscious domain.13   This blocking threshold  determines the degree of blocking of some thinking 
processors by forbidden wishes. Thresholds can depend on  processors. For some individuals (having rather small 
values of blocking thresholds), a forbidden wish  may completely stop the flow of information from some processors to 
the subconscious domain. The same hidden forbidden wish may  play a negligible role for individuals having rather 
large magnitude of blocking thresholds. Therefore the blocking thresholds are important characteristics which can be 
used to distinguish normal and abnormal  behaviors.  14 In our mental cybernetic model blocking thresholds play the 
                                                 
13
 It might happen that analysis in the subconscious domain would demonstrate that this idea has sufficiently high consistency (larger 
than the realization threshold) and both measures of interest and interdiction are less than  corresponding maximum thresholds. In 
the absence of hidden forbidden wishes this idea-attractor would  be  realized. 
14
 “I found the confirmation that forgotten memories  were not lost. They were in the 
patient’s possession and were ready to emerge in association  to what still was known by 
role of sources of the resistance force which does not permit reappearance of hidden forbidden wishes, desires and wild 
impulses which were repressed. 
 
We note  again that blocking thresholds depends on thinking processors. Thus the same individual  can have the normal 
threshold for one thinking block and abnormal degree of blocking for another thinking block. 
 
 
 ,  -/  The unconscious analyzer  computes the distance between an idea-attractor (produced by a 
thinking block PR1) and the database of hidden forbidden wishes. If this distance is relatively small, i.e., the measure of 
unconscious interdiction  is relatively large, then such an idea-attractor does not go to the subconscious domain.} 
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The pleasure principle is a psychoanalytical term coined by Sigmund Freud. Respectively, the desire for immediate 
gratification versus the deferral of that gratification.  Quite simply, the pleasure principle drives one to seek pleasure 
and to avoid pain.  We shall present AI-justification of this principle. It is convenient to consider  the evolution of the 
pleasure-function through development from Model  1 to Model 4.  We start with Model 2. In this model pleasure is 
identified with the interest-measure. This mental quantity takes its values in the segment [k, 1]. Thus  
we quantified pleasure. The value k corresponds to minimal pleasure and the value 1 to maximal pleasure. This 
quantity of interest-pleasure is the basis for ordering of  ideas attractors for their realization. The brain wants most the 
ideas having the highest  magnitude of pleasure. Such ideas have the highest priority in realization.15   Moreover, ideas  
inducing not so much pleasure (e.g., pleasure which little bit extends  the value k) might be never realized, because they 
might  just disappear from the collector of ideas waiting for realization. Thus a brain based on Model 2  would like to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
him; but there was some force that prevented them from becoming conscious and compelled 
them to remain unconscious. The existence of this force could be assumed with 
certainty...”, Freud, 1962b 
 
 
15
 The feeling of pleasure is approached at the moment of realization. The strength of this feeling is determined  
by the magnitude of the interest-measure. 
maximize the pleasure-function which is defined on the space of ideas.  We recall that the interest-measure increases 
with the decreasing of the distance from an  idea-attractor to the interest-database. 
 
We now consider Model 3. Here a brain can calculate not only the  interest-function on the space of ideas,  but also the 
interdiction function. The purpose of the latter one is to prevent such a brain from conflicts with reality. Here we chose 
a pleasure-reality function is identified with the consistency-function. As was mentioned, the simplest form of the 
consistency function is simply the difference between the functions of interest and interdiction: 
 
                             PLEASURE—REALITY = INTEREST  -  INTERDICTION, 
 
  Thus the greatest pleasure and at the same time the greatest consistency with reality   is approached in the case of the 
highest interest and the lowest interdiction,  e.g., the interest-measure = 1 and the interdiction-measure = k , so the the 
pleasure-reality function takes the value 1-k. It is a good point  to remark that the pleasure-reality function (given by 
the measure of consistency) depends on an individual. In general it is an arbitrary  linear combination of interest and 
interdiction: 
                        
                             PLEASURE—REALITY = a INTEREST + b INTERDICTION, 
 
where a and b some coefficients.  
 
In Model 4 the pleasure-reality function is the same as in Model 3. Finally, we consider Model 1.  Here we have only 
dynamical systems which process external and internal stimuli and produce ideas-attractors which play the role of 
reactions to those stimuli. Pleasure is approached by realizations of those ideas-attractors. Here Id totally dominates. 
We now analyze deeper the structure of the pleasure function. As everything in our models this function is based on the 
mental distance. Therefore the pleasure principle as well as the reality principle  are based on the metric structure of 
mental space.  
 
34	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We do not plan to present here a detailed review on other approaches to psycho-robots. To emphasize differences of 
our approach from other developments of psycho-robots, we  present a citation from the work of Potkonjak el al, 2002:  
“Man–machine communication had been recognized a long time ago as a significant issue in the implementation of automation. It 
influences the machine effectiveness through direct costs for operator training and through more or less comfortable working 
conditions. The solution for the increased effectiveness might be found in user-friendly human–machine interface. In robotics, the 
question of communication and its user-friendliness is becoming even more significant. It is no longer satisfactory that a 
communication can be called “human–machine interface”, since one must see robots as future collaborators, service workers, and 
probably personal helpers.” In contrast, the main aim of our modeling is not at all creation of friendly helpers to increase 
their effectiveness. We would like to create AI-systems which would really have essential elements of human psyche. 
We shown that already psycho-robots with a rather simple AI-psyche – two emotions and two corresponding data bases 
– would exhibit (if one really wants to simulate human’s psyche)  very complicated psychological behavior. In 
particular, they would create various psychical complexes which would be exhibited via symptoms.   We also point out 
to the crucial difference of our “Freudian psycho-robots” from psycho-robots created for different computer game 
(“psycho-automata”).  
Our aims are similar of those formulated for humanoid robots, see e.g. Brooks et al., 1981a,b, 1999, 2002. However, 
we jump directly to high level psyche (without to create e.g. the visual representation of reality). The idea  of Luc 
Steels to create a robot culture via societies of self-educating robots,  Manuel, 2003, is also very attractive for us. It is 
clear that real humanoid psyche (including complexes and symptoms) could be created only in society of interacting 
Psychots and people. Moreover, such AI-societies of Psychots can be used for modeling psychoanalytic problems and 
development of new methodologies of treatment of such problems. 
5,		 
 
We proposed a series of the AI-type models for advanced psychological behavior. Our approach is based on 
geometrization of psychological processes via introduction of mental metric space, dynamical processing of mental 
states and emotional-type decision making based on quantative measures of interest and interdiction and corresponding 
data bases of ideas. Increasing complexity  of AI-modeling implies with necessity appearance of psychological features 
such as complexes and symptoms which are being handled by psychoanalysis during the last hundred   years.  Such a 
complicated behavior has not only negative consequences (e.g. hysteric reactions)16, but it also plays an important 
controlling role.  
 
The presented AI-models can be used for creation of AI-systems, which we call psycho-robots (Psychots), exhibiting 
important elements of human psyche. At the moment domestic robots are merely simple working devices  However, in 
future one can expect demand in  systems which be able not only perform simple work tasks, but would have elements 
of human self-developing  psyche. Such AI-psyche could play an important role both in relations between psycho-
robots and their owners as well as between psycho-robots. Since the presence of a huge numbers of psycho-complexes 
is an essential characteristic of human psychology, it would be interesting to model them in the AI-framework. As was 
already pointed out, complex psychological behavior induces important controlling structures which are self-
developing  (in the process of interaction of a psycho-robot with human beings or other psycho-robots). However, 
psycho-robots would pay the same price for complexity of their psyche as it was paid by people.  Some psycho-robots  
would exhibit  elements of psychopathic behavior.  
 
One of major contributions of AI and cognitive science to psychology has been the information human thinking in  
which metaphor brain- as-computer is taken literally. In the present paper we extended the AI-approach to modeling of 
human psychology.  We created the computer-architecture for modeling of very delicate features of human 
psychological behavior.  
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